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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/05/2006

Accident number: 382

Accident time: Not recorded

Accident Date: 27/07/2002

Where it occurred: MF 503

Country: Lebanon

Primary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)

Class: Excavation accident

Date of main report: 26/08/2002

ID original source: BOI:No008/2002

Name of source: MACC SL

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: No.4 Israel AP blast /
frag

Ground condition: dry/dusty
rocks/stones

Date record created: 22/02/2004

Date last modified: 23/03/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system:

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: MF 503

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
mechanical follow-up (?)
inadequate equipment (?)

Accident report
A summarised MACC BOI report was made available in 2003. It is reproduced below, edited
for anonymity. The acronym MDD stands for Mine Detecting Dogs.

Introduction
1.
[1st commercial demining group] has been using mechanical preparation,
manual clearance and MDD verification at minefield 503 since they were issued Task Dossier
OES 3# 010 on the 22 June 2002. While working on minefield 503 several more minefields
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have also been discovered during the verification of the outer minefield parameters. The MTI
325 flailed one lane in a previously uncleared area when a detonation occurred. The MTI 325
reversed out of the area and manual demining assets were tasked to clear this new
discovered minefield. This new discovered minefield was designated M/F 503/A.
2. On the day of the accident a [1st commercial demining group] Deminer was conducting
manual clearance in a clearance lane next to a row of No.4 mines. While using the demining
trowel to scratch small pieces of gravel away from one No.4 mine, it detonated. The Deminer
then rolled over to the right from the blast, while rolling he actually rolled over an uncleared
area down into a cleared area.
3. [1st commercial demining group] M7 Team Leader was standing 25m away when he
heard the blast and went to the place of the accident to check on the cause. The Team
Leader then called for medical assistance and at the same time [1st commercial demining
group] M5 Team Leader brought in a stretcher. The casualty was then placed on a stretcher
and carried to safe area where the victim was stabilized by the Medic. A Deminer was
ordered to close off the accident working lane ensuring that all equipment was untouched.
4. Once the Deminer was stabilized, he was placed into the ambulance and taken to Bint
Jubayl Hospital. Due to the extent of his injuries, the Deminer was transferred to Hammoud
Hospital Sidon in order to receive the correct specialist treatment.

Medical details
5. The casualty suffered compound fracture to his right index finger, deep lacerations to his
upper lip and superficial multiple abrasions to his upper right arm.

Conclusions
6. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry
concludes the following:
•

The Deminer was following National TSGs and [1st commercial demining group]’s
SOPs concerning manual demining drills.

•

The Deminer was wearing his PPE in accordance to National TSGs and [1st
commercial demining group]’s SOPs, which reduced his injuries.

•

The Deminer was thrown out of his safe lane by the blast wave. Before he stopped
rolling, he rolled through an uncleared area before he stopped inside a safe area.

•

The visor shattered after being impacted with rock fragments at extremely high
velocities following the detonation of the high explosive.

•

The visor did not maintain its integrity following the uncontrolled detonation of an
Israeli No.4 AP mine.

•

The protective jacket was pierced by debris but still maintained its integrity. [The
“jacket” was in fact a frontal apron.]

•

The previous one time flailing of the area may have had a direct effect on the
sensitivity state of the mine fuze. (Para 26 to this report refers).

•

The site stabilization of causality was performed in a safe area.

•

No IMAS currently covers Mechanical Mine Clearance techniques.

•

Internal and external communications with [1st commercial demining group] and
MACC SL functioned very well.

•

Medical attention and evacuation was conducted in a safe and effective manner.

•

The BOI don’t agree with the [1st commercial demining group] report concerning the
tools used when the accident occurred. The reason is that the BOI had the
opportunity to question the Deminer after the accident, which [1st commercial
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demining group] did not have due to time stress while delivering their report within 36
hours after the accident.

Recommendations
7. Based on the investigation, the statements and visits to the site, the Board of Inquiry
recommends the following:
•

An amendment is necessary to the [1st commercial demining group]’s SOPs detailing
procedures for manual clearance and demolitions in areas that are on a slope.
Referring to the Deminer rolling into an uncleared area. Procedures should be
adapted to make sure that the area below the deminer is cleared

•

Revise the procedures of “actions on” when MTI 325 flail system is used in the area
reduction role and detonates the first “assumed” mine.

•

The future issue IMAS 9.50 “Guide to use of Mechanical Mine Clearance Equipment”
will hopefully give direction regarding the use of mechanical assets.

•

The conclusions detailed in this report be disseminated amongst all [1st commercial
demining group] Operational Field Staff.

•

A period of refresher / confidence training is conducted with [1st commercial demining
group] Operational Field Staff, to include the following: Manual excavation
Techniques.

Signed: QA MDD Officer, Mine Action Co-ordination Centre Southern Lebanon

Victim Report
Victim number: 499

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: Not made available
(insured HMT)

Time to hospital: Not recorded

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron, Long
visor

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Arm
minor Face
severe Finger
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.
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Analysis
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as “Unavoidable” because the
Victim appears to have been working as directed and in accordance with approved working
methods when the detonation occurred.
The investigation of this accident is listed as “inadequate” because it does not include detailed
statements or the full evidence on which the conclusions are based. This may be because it is
a “summary”. No time of accident or Medevac timings were recorded.
The visor shattering is the second time this happened with this group in Lebanon and raises
questions about the age and condition of the visor. Polycarbonate is hardened by prolonged
exposure to UV and becomes much more likely to shatter.
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